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Secure audio processing
ABSTRACT
Automatic speech recognizers (ASR) are now nearly ubiquitous, finding application in
smart assistants, smartphones, smart speakers, and other devices. An attack on an ASR that
triggers such a device into carrying out false instructions can lead to severe consequences.
Typically, speech recognition is performed using machine learning models, e.g., neural
networks, whose intermediate outputs are not always fully concealed. Exposing such
intermediate outputs makes the crafting of malicious input audio easier. This disclosure
describes techniques that thwart attacks on speech recognition systems by moving model
inference processing to a secure computing enclave. The memory of the secure enclave and
signals are inaccessible to the user and untrusted processes, and therefore, resistant to attacks.
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BACKGROUND
Recent years have seen a proliferation of smart assistants in the marketplace. Such
devices, e.g., smart speakers, smartphones, etc., rely on automatic speech recognition (ASR)
systems to decipher instructions. ASR systems use machine learning models, e.g., based on
multi-layer neural networks to recognize speech. An adversary can use intermediate parameters
of the machine learning model, e.g., intermediate weights of a multi-layer neural network, to
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compromise speech recognition. It is easy to imagine the severe consequences that would result
if a speech recognition system is compromised.
DESCRIPTION
Speech processing and recognition is typically performed on digital signal processors
(DSP) or other embedded speech-processing engines. The implementation of ASR on such
processors makes intermediate parameters such as neural network weights or intermediate
outputs visible. Such visibility, alongside the visibility of the output target labels, make the
crafting of malicious input audio simpler.
The techniques of this disclosure relocate inference processing by the machine learning
model from a DSP or embedded processor to a separate integrated circuit (IC) or hardware
block. The memory and side-channel signals of this IC or hardware block are inaccessible to the
user or untrusted processes. Such a separate and inaccessible hardware block is known as a
secure enclave.

Fig. 1: Secure audio processing
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Such secure audio processing is illustrated in Fig. 1. With user consent and permission,
signals from a microphone (102) are directly routed to secure enclave (104) that securely
encloses a machine learning model (106) for speech recognition. The parameters of the machine
learning model are encrypted and uploaded (108) to the enclave.
Inference processing by the machine learning model in the enclave does not expose
intermediate output. Only the ASR output (110), e.g., text transcripts or binary decisions, are
exposed. Confidence scores or full output weights either do not leave the enclave, or are
encrypted before exiting the enclave. The secure enclave multiplexes other hardware blocks
that access audio, e.g. the telephony stack, additional DSPs, other trusted downstream enclaves,
etc.

Fig. 2: Secure audio processing using server-side processing

Fig. 2 illustrates an alternate framework for secure audio that leverages server-side
processing. In this framework, with user permission and consent, signals from microphone
(202) are encrypted (204) immediately after analog processing. The encrypted audio is not
accessible to the local device, and is sent to a secured server (206) for processing, e.g., for
speech recognition. In this manner, an attacker that targets the local device is thwarted.
Further to the descriptions above, a user may be provided with controls allowing the
user to make an election as to both if and when systems, programs or features described herein
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may enable collection of user information (e.g., information about a user’s social network,
social actions or activities, profession, a user’s preferences, or a user’s current location), and if
the user is sent content or communications from a server. In addition, certain data may be
treated in one or more ways before it is stored or used, so that personally identifiable
information is removed. For example, a user’s identity may be treated so that no personally
identifiable information can be determined for the user, or a user’s geographic location may be
generalized where location information is obtained (such as to a city, ZIP code, or state level),
so that a particular location of a user cannot be determined. Thus, the user may have control
over what information is collected about the user, how that information is used, and what
information is provided to the user.
CONCLUSION
This disclosure describes a speech processing or recognition system that is resistant to
adversarial attacks. With user consent and permission, microphone signals are directly routed to
a secure enclave. The memory of the secure enclave and the signals are inaccessible by the user
or by untrusted processes. Inference processing by a machine learning model is performed
within the secure enclave. Intermediate outputs of the model are not exposed outside the
enclave. Model parameters are encrypted prior to uploading to the secure enclave, and only
ASR outputs, such as text transcripts or binary decisions, are made available as return values
from the secure enclave. Alternately, microphone output is securely encrypted and sent to a
server for processing, such that the encrypted audio is inaccessible to the local device. In this
manner, audio recognition and processing is made resistant to attacks.
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